A common mistake in analyzing group violence is to assume that persons “lose” their individuality inside the group.
But in many cases—especially in settings shaped by chronic insecurity and repeated humiliation—there was never a fully stable, differentiated self in the first place. What develops instead is a self organized around unmet psychological needs: recognition, containment, coherence.
The earliest layer matters here. In the first years of life—the “unseen years” from zero to three—attachment is formed. When early caregiving is shaped by stress, instability, or broader patterns in which early relational vulnerability is unevenly distributed by gender, primary attachment relationships can themselves carry strain. In some shame–honor environments, girls in particular may be subjected to earlier and more continuous forms of social surveillance, where family reputation is projected onto their behavior and perceived propriety. The result is not absence of attachment, but attachment under pressure: inconsistent mirroring, heightened vigilance, and weaker internal cohesion.
The devalued girl does not simply disappear. In shame–honor systems, she is offered a single path toward restored dignity: the role of mother—and, at its extreme, the mother of a martyr. What was withheld from her as a child is symbolically returned through her son’s heroism. Her suffering becomes retroactively meaningful. This is not false consciousness—it is the logic of a system that converts female humiliation into the reproduction of the group’s capacity for violence.
In shame–honor systems, humiliation is not a secondary emotion. It is structural. It organizes memory, identity, and interpretation. Wounds to honor are not processed and resolved; they are reactivated through collective narrative, where political events become proof of dignity restored or dignity violated.
In that context, the group does not erase the self. It organizes what was never fully separated.
This is visible in movements like Hamas, where ideology is not primarily belief. It functions as regulation—of affect i.e. feelings, of shame, of fragmentation—under conditions of external pressure and internal humiliation.
Collective identity stabilizes what cannot be held alone. Narrative converts humiliation into meaning. Belonging regulates shame and rage. Political action becomes, at times, less strategy than repair of dignity.
In a recent conversation, a colleague remarked on the symbolic link between weapon and masculinity in militant contexts — how carrying a weapon can be articulated not only as function, but as restored status and manhood: “now he is a man when he wears his weapon.”
What matters is not the anecdote itself, but what it makes explicit: in these settings, weapons are not only tools of violence. They become anchors of identity after humiliation.
This is why disarmament cannot be treated as a technical step toward “post-conflict stability.”
From the outside, it appears as policy. From within this logic, it is structural. Weapons are tied to coherence, dignity, and the maintenance of the self as organized through the group. Removing them is not a tactical adjustment—it is experienced as destabilization of identity itself.
This is where current negotiations around Gaza actually sit: one side speaks in terms of demilitarization and reconstruction; the other in terms of guarantees against vulnerability, humiliation, and erasure.
The result is not simply deadlock. It is a collision between two incompatible systems of meaning.
One treats war as an operational problem. The other treats it as a structure of psychic organization under conditions of humiliation.
The first step out of this impasse is not a better proposal. It is recognition — of the developmental wound at its root. Not sympathy, and not concession. But the acknowledgment that you are negotiating with a self whose coherence depends on what you are asking it to surrender.
And perhaps something more direct is now required. The time may have come for negotiators to name this explicitly — to bring the question of shame and humiliation into the room itself. Not as accusation, and not as psychologizing from a distance, but as a genuine confrontation: what has this cost you, and what would it mean to be recognized without a weapon in your hand?
To the author’s knowledge, this has never been systematically attempted. Negotiators are trained in interests, incentives, and leverage — not in the psychology of humiliation or the developmental roots of group identity. That gap may itself be part of why the impasse persists.
Not all interlocutors will be reachable by this. Some are too embedded in the system to hear it. But some may be. And the attempt itself — the willingness to address the psychological reality rather than talk around it — would represent a different kind of negotiation than anything tried so far.
Until that is attempted, every framework will fail at the same point, for the same reason.

