From Inside the Room
Due to the length of this post AI translations in Hebrew, Portuguese, French and German will be posted separately.
I was not surprised.
That is not a comfortable thing to say about either of the things I am about to describe. But it is true, and a piece about moral clarity should probably begin with it.
I am a graduate of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, trained in a field that I have loved and that has troubled me in equal measure. The antisemitism I have witnessed flooding through professional psychology and psychoanalysis since October 7, 2023 did not come as a shock to me. I perceived it during my own training — in moments I noted and set aside, in assumptions that passed unremarked, in a certain quality of institutional silence around questions that should not have been silent. It was always there. What has changed since October 7 is the volume, and the boldness.
Nor was I surprised by the massacre itself. That is harder to say. But my work on the ground concerning jihad — the ideological structure of it, how it moves, what it promises to those it recruits — had informed me in ways that the professional mainstream had not absorbed. I knew what that movement was capable of and what it intended. The horror of October 7 was not unimaginable to me. It had been imagined, in the worst sense, by those who planned it for years.
These two things — the antisemitism in my field and the attack on October 7 — are not unrelated. That connection is part of what I want to trace here.
I am now part of a group of analysts — many of them IPA members — working on these questions from the inside, because the mainstream institutions have not been doing so adequately on their own. That such a group needs to exist is itself a statement about the state of things. What we are witnessing is a flood: Israeli analysts excluded from international professional spaces; Jewish colleagues subjected to a standard of scrutiny applied to no one else; an antisemitic psychoanalyst operating in Qatar, connected to international networks, whose presence raises no institutional alarm; the American Psychological Association taking months to acknowledge what its Jewish members were reporting, while its affiliated email servers were used to promote boycotts and, on occasion, to defend Hamas.
The analyst Prof. Merav Roth — who after October 7 formed a network of 450 psychoanalysts providing pro bono long-term therapy for survivors, who has spent two years treating former hostages and the families of the murdered, who received the Sigourney Award in 2024 for her life’s work — has had to fight to be heard in the very international institutions that should be honoring what she has built. This is what the flood looks like up close.
The Permission Structure
What Jung and Lacan share is not identical politics. What they share is a structure: a moral failure that was not incidental to their theoretical projects but entangled with them, and a field that responded by treating the entanglement as a footnote. That response — repeated, institutionalized, passed down through training institutes and clinical cultures and publishing traditions — taught the field something. It taught that a certain level of antisemitism is professionally tolerable. That theoretical sophistication and institutional status purchase exemption from moral accountability. That Jewish particularity can be dismissed as special pleading while other particularities are treated as legitimate.
When you do not do the reckoning, you do not develop the capacity to recognize or refuse what comes next. There is a failure to set boundaries. And so the culture becomes hospitable to what is now flooding in.
What the Field Decided Not to Know
What I am describing is a three-layered failure, and it is worth being precise about each layer — because the field is sophisticated enough to deflect criticism by conceding the lesser charges while protecting the deeper ones.
The first layer is about intellectual honesty and genealogy. Where did these ideas come from, who paid the price for them to be developed, what was the human and historical context. Lacan cites Freud endlessly but strips him of his specificity. Jung builds on a tradition of German Romantic psychology without acknowledging what his racialized version of it enabled. The citation is there but the accountability that should accompany citation — the acknowledgment of debt, of context, of consequence — is absent.
But the second layer is deeper than citation practice. It is about what the field decided was worth knowing about itself. A field makes choices about what goes in the introduction and what goes in the footnote, what gets named in the first lecture of a training program and what gets mentioned obliquely if at all. Those choices constitute a culture. The choice to soft-pedal Jung’s racial typology, repeated across decades of training institutes and textbooks and supervision, produced analysts who genuinely do not know — or know only vaguely, as distant controversy — what their founding figure did and what his theory enabled. That is not a citation problem. It is a transmission problem. The field decided not to transmit this clearly.
The third layer is the deepest. Even when people do know — and many do — the field lacks a moral language adequate to say what needs to be said. It has extraordinary conceptual sophistication for analyzing the psyche. It has almost no tradition of applying that sophistication to its own institutional behavior and history. The concepts for doing so exist — repression, denial, the return of what is not acknowledged — but turning those concepts on the institution itself has been treated as bad form, as uncollegial, as political.
So it is not just that authority is miscited. It is that the field built a culture in which the moral weight of its own history cannot be spoken plainly — and then acted surprised when that unspoken weight kept returning, in new forms, with new faces, in new professional contexts.
That is what repression looks like at an institutional scale. And that is the culture in which the current flood became possible.
Jung: When the Theory Was the Problem
Let me be precise about what I am and am not claiming about Jung.
I am not claiming he was a simple Nazi. The historical record is more complicated than that, and the complication is itself part of the problem — because complexity has been used, systematically, as a reason not to state the moral case clearly.
What the record shows is this: in 1933, after Ernst Kretschmer resigned the presidency of the International General Medical Society for Psychotherapy rather than collaborate with the new Nazi regime, Jung took the position. Under his leadership, the society was reorganized so that German members answered directly to Nazi oversight, while Jewish members could remain only as individual international affiliates — structurally demoted, their institutional standing dissolved. Jung continued to publish, to lead, to give interviews, during the years the regime whose institutional requirements he was accommodating was burning Freud’s books, forcing Jewish analysts into exile, and beginning the process that would end in the murder of millions.
Freud — whose books were burned, whose sisters died in the camps, whose life’s work was destroyed along with the institutions he built — watched this happen from exile. Jung continued to practice and theorize.
But here is what matters most, and what is most consistently soft-pedaled: the accommodation was not a purely opportunistic or personal failure separable from Jung’s theory. The racial typology was already in the theory.
Jung had written, before the Nazi period and continuing through it, that different peoples had fundamentally different collective unconscious contents. The Germanic unconscious had access to primordial depths — the Wotanic layer — that the Jewish psyche, being too rational, too adapted to surface existence, too cerebral, could not reach. His critique of Freudian psychoanalysis as a “Jewish psychology” — valid perhaps for Jews but limited, unable to access the deeper Germanic or Aryan layers of the psyche — was not a remark made under political pressure. It runs through his theoretical work.
When the Nazis needed a psychological framework that could distinguish between healthy German psychic life and the pathological or alien influence of Jewish intellectualism, Jung’s framework offered exactly that scaffolding. It was not retrofitted to serve that purpose. The categories were already there.
This is what the standard intellectual introduction to Jung does not say. It says there were “controversies,” “wartime complexities,” “debates about his conduct.” These framings are accurate in the way that saying a building has “structural issues” is accurate about a building with no foundation.
Lacan: Appropriation and the Erasure of Origin
The Lacan case is different in mechanism but related in effect, and it is less often discussed because it is subtler and because Lacan has become so central to so much contemporary theory that examining its foundations feels threatening to a great deal of intellectual architecture.
Psychoanalysis as Freud built it was a specifically Jewish intellectual project — not because its content was Jewish theology, but because it emerged from a particular historical location: secular Jewish intellectuals in fin-de-siècle Vienna, thinking about the unconscious life of a civilization that was simultaneously absorbing them and generating violent resistance to that absorption. The theory of repression, the uncanny, the way civilization generates its own pathology from what it cannot acknowledge — these ideas have a biographical and historical location. They come from somewhere. They come from the experience of people living on a particular kind of boundary, inside and outside at once.
Lacan took this entire edifice, restructured it through Saussurean linguistics and Hegelian philosophy, and in the process stripped it of that historical specificity almost entirely. Freud became a text to be corrected, a precursor to be superseded, rather than a person whose project had a specific location in Jewish European history. The thought was universalized. Its origins were dissolved.
Emmanuel Levinas wrote about this dynamic — not targeting Lacan specifically, but describing a tendency of European philosophy to absorb Jewish thought while erasing its Jewish character, treating it as raw material for more “universal” theorizing. The description fits with uncomfortable precision.
The genetic fallacy is a real fallacy, and it is worth understanding precisely — because it is being misused. The fallacy is this: judging an idea as true or false based on where it came from rather than on its own merits. The source of an idea is logically independent of its validity. This is correct, as far as it goes.
But the genetic fallacy only governs truth claims. It says: don’t let origin contaminate your assessment of whether an idea is correct. It says nothing whatsoever about whether you are morally obligated to reckon with that origin. Those are completely different questions. One is epistemological. The other is ethical.
Saying Lacan’s restructuring of Freud doesn’t become theoretically worthless because of how he treated his intellectual inheritance is a legitimate application of the principle. Saying therefore we don’t need to discuss what was taken, from whom, under what historical conditions, and what was erased is not. That second move is not logic. It is evasion dressed as logic.
You can hold both things simultaneously without contradiction: the mirror stage may be a genuine theoretical contribution, and Lacan’s erasure of psychoanalysis’s Jewish origins requires explicit moral accounting. The ideas can be evaluated on their merits and the history can be stated plainly. These are not in tension. The field acts as though they are — because collapsing them into apparent tension is what makes the moral accounting seem optional.
That is what I mean by the genetic fallacy being deployed rather than applied. It is a legitimate philosophical principle being used as a professional exemption from moral responsibility, a psychological ‘get out of jail’ free card.
The Through Line to the Flood
The connection between these historical failures and the present flood is not metaphorical. It is structural.
A field that was never forced to say clearly — Jung’s racial typology provided ideological scaffolding to a regime that murdered Jews, and this is not separable from his theory — is a field that never developed the moral language to identify and resist what is happening now. A field that absorbed Lacan’s universalizing erasure of psychoanalysis’s Jewish origins without comment is a field that learned to treat Jewish intellectual particularity as something to be dissolved rather than honored.
The analyst who operates from Qatar with antisemitic commitments and maintains international professional standing is not an aberration in this culture. She is a product of it. The institutions that took months to respond to Jewish members reporting harassment and exclusion were not simply slow. They were drawing on decades of learned tolerance for exactly this.
What I find myself returning to, from inside the group doing this work, is how much energy is required simply to make the problem visible — to get the field to look at what it has been trained not to see. That group exists because that visibility has to be fought for. Prof. Merav Roth’s network of 450 analysts exists because the mainstream institutions were not going to build it. The open letter exists because the organization needed to be pushed by its own members before it would act.
None of this is how a field that had done the reckoning behaves. It is how a field behaves when the reckoning was never done.
What Moral Clarity Actually Requires
It requires saying, in standard intellectual introductions to Jung, not that he “had controversial views” or that there are “debates about his wartime conduct,” but that he racially theorized Jewish psychology in ways that provided ideological scaffolding for a regime that murdered Jews, during the years that regime was doing so, while continuing to benefit professionally. And that this is not separable from his theory in the way a youthful mistake or a purely personal failing would be.
It requires acknowledging that the destruction of Jewish psychoanalysis — the burning of books, the exile and murder of analysts, the dismantling of the Berlin and Vienna institutes — happened in a world where Jung was an accommodating and professionally active presence.
It requires, in the Lacanian case, an honest account of what was taken, from whom, under what historical conditions, and what was erased in the universalizing translation.
And it requires, now, naming what is happening in our professional institutions as antisemitism — not as political disagreement, not as passionate advocacy for Palestinian rights, not as a complex situation requiring careful balance — when that is what it is. The two things are not the same. The conflation of the two is itself part of the problem.
None of this is a reason to stop reading Jung or Lacan, or to abandon the professional institutions that need to be changed from within. But the moral accounting has to come first, stated plainly, not buried in a footnote or dissolved in a sentence about complexity.
The complexity is real. It does not dissolve the weight.
The Deepest Irony
Psychoanalysis, built substantially by Jewish intellectuals thinking about repression, about the return of what is denied, about the way groups constitute their identity through what they exclude — has within it the precise conceptual tools to analyze what is happening when it fails to reckon with antisemitism in its own house.
The concepts are there. The application of those concepts to the institution’s own functioning is largely absent.
That is either a very deep repression or a very telling blind spot.
In psychoanalytic terms, the distinction between those two things matters enormously.
The field does not seem eager to find out which it is. Those of us inside it are going to keep asking.
The author is a graduate of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis and a member of a group of analysts working on antisemitism within the field.She is author of six books on jihad and currently writing her next —Between Empire and Covenant: The Jewish Bond, Lotman, The Refuseniks and The Bukharan Jews, 1977. She is Israeli American residing in Tel Aviv.


Dear Nancy, I am so happy to have found you and am so happy to know your group exists. I am a psychoanalytic psychotherapist in Australia, writing and talking about the antisemitism and antizionism around me, and have been dismayed by the political takeover of the psychoanalytic literature. and the marginalization of Jewish voices (which duplicates that in the arts and the left) seemingly almost without opposition and asking myself what it means. I do have an anecdote from here about the Jungians (I am not one). Their group is the only one I know of that has actually welcomed two senior Jewish members to present their story - even though it was greeted with virtual silence. Their interpretation of the silence is that it was politely hiding the conviction that they were apologists for genocide. They wished it would have been expressed. I wonder whether Jung's backstory has been sufficiently integrated (they seemed to think so) so as to create some kind of caution or brakes - that allowed the presentation to go ahead - on the the political takeover. Dr Lynette Chazan