The Flydubai copilot — reportedly 29-year-old Omani national Hamam al-Hammami — was born to an Omani father and a Syrian mother. Osama bin Laden’s mother, Alia Ghanem, was also Syrian — Alawite, from Latakia. Two cases is not a pattern, and I want to say that plainly before saying anything else. But it is the tailor’s red thread worth pulling on, because the question it raises isn’t about nationality. It’s about what a mother carries into the bond before a child has language, and what that bond then carries forward.
Internalization during the unseen years, zero to three, doesn’t transmit a passport. It transmits whatever the mother herself was never able to metabolize — her own unprocessed terrors, her own position inside a culture that did or didn’t hold her safely. A Syrian mother’s maternal line isn’t a risk factor in itself. What would matter is how she was formed inside, and what was handed forward without ever naming it. No report gives her a name, only “Syrian mother.” If Arabic convention holds and he is her eldest son, she would be known as Umm Hamam — mother of Hamam — a woman identified by the culture, and by us, only through the son she bore. That is maternal identification in miniature.
Syria sharpens this further in bin Laden’s case specifically. For decades under the Assads, Syria was Iran’s one dependable Arab ally — hosting Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces, serving as the overland lifeline to Hezbollah — but that alliance ran through a precarious identity. The ruling family was Alawite, a heterodox ninth-century offshoot of Shia Islam considered heretical by orthodox Sunni and Shia theologians alike, governing a Sunni-majority country it could never fully claim to represent. Bin Laden’s mother came from that same Alawite community. Her maternal line wasn’t simply Syrian; it was formed inside a minority whose claim to belong was permanently contested, whose security depended on an alliance with a foreign Shia power, and whose rule has since collapsed. Assad fell in December 2024; Iran’s presence in Syria has nearly vanished; Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa aka al-Jolani, has publicly denounced Tehran while still insisting the Golan is Syrian, the Golan that gave him his nom de guerre. A persecution anxiety formed inside that structure is not abstract. It is the felt knowledge, handed down before language, that belonging is never secure and always has to be defended by force.
The divorce detail falls inside the same unseen years. By her own account, Alia Ghanem divorced Mohammed bin Laden when Osama was three, and her second husband, Mohammed al-Attas, raised him; some sources date the separation to soon after his birth. Whether the copilot’s parents separated, and where he spent his first three years, the reporting does not say. It is the question a threat assessment would need to ask. The same holds for his sect. The reporting says only that he held “radical ideological views”; it does not say whether he radicalized into a Sunni current, a Shia one, or something else, in a country where nearly half the population is Ibadi, a school distinct from both. His Omani passport presumably came through his father. His primary identification may have run through his Syrian mother. That is a hypothesis, not a finding, and the missing facts would test it: who raised him, and in whose household.
The Ibadi Question
Ibadism deserves a paragraph of its own. Among the oldest surviving schools of Islam, it descends from the early dispute over leadership after Ali, but it broke with the Kharijite extremists and rejects the label. It holds that a leader is chosen for piety, not lineage, and that a Muslim who commits a grave sin is guilty of ingratitude, not unbelief. Ibadis do not declare other Muslims apostates, and that declaration is the move on which jihadi takfir depends. If the copilot’s father’s family was Ibadi, as nearly half of Omanis are, then radicalization meant leaving a school unusually resistant to it. If the family was Sunni, the question changes. Either way, the sect he came from and the sect he moved toward are facts the file would need before the hypothesis about his mother can be tested.
There’s a mirror version of this worth noting as an aside. Foreign women who relocated to Syria to join radicalized sons or husbands — the mothers dubbed “Jihadi Gran” in the French press, the women who travel from Europe to be near sons fighting for the Islamic State — are performing something structurally close to an inverted “aliyah”: not a biological ancestral return to a mother’s own origin, but a relocation toward a land the ideology has made into the place where the “true” self and “true” community exist in fantasy. It isn’t the same mechanism as bin Laden’s or the Hammami’s maternal inheritance, but it’s identification with the same psychic geography, approached from the opposite direction.
And al-Jolani himself is the state-level version of the whole structure. A rebranded, suited, Western-facing leader who meets Trump, shoots hoops with Adm. Brad Cooper, the commander of U.S. Central Command, together with Adm. Kevin Lambert and negotiates security arrangements with Israel, while his government insists the Golan remains Syrian. Presentation and position split cleanly apart, exactly as they do in a person — a modern face worn over a claim to the Golan that he has not withdrawn.
What the File Leaves Out
What should counterterrorism practitioners take from this, given that it rests on two cases and a hypothesis rather than a finding? Not a profiling rule — a Syrian mother predicts nothing. What it argues for is a different question asked earlier in any vetting process. Oman flagged this copilot for suspected radicalization and removed him from flight training; Flydubai hired him anyway, though it is unclear whether the airline knew; the file on him, like most files, would have tracked stated ideology, travel, associations, possessed material. None of that asks who formed his earliest bond, or what the mother herself was carrying when she could not yet have known it would matter. That isn’t a question any security service can currently answer. But it’s the question a psychoanalytically informed threat assessment would at least know to hold open, rather than closing the file the moment an ideology has been named and assuming the explanation is complete. After all, the attempted hijacking may have been, underneath it all, a return to his ummi.
Nancy Hartevelt Kobrin, PhD, is a Tel Aviv–based psychoanalyst and counterterrorism scholar. https://www.amazon.com/Nancy-Kobrin/e/B002RF9D5Y


