Earlier this week I reviewed Yossi Sheffi’s Unsafe at MIT: A Chronicle of a Campus War on the Jews. I wanted to write this companion piece as Sheffi documents more than a dispute over campus politics. It raises a deeper psychological question: What happens when an institution dedicated to reason, science, and inquiry becomes unable to recognize the suffering of members of its own community?
The story of MIT after October 7 is not only about slogans, protests, or political disagreement. It is about a breakdown in human recognition. A university is supposed to be a place where complexity is preserved, where competing narratives can coexist, and where individuals are encountered as human beings rather than symbols. When that capacity weakens, scapegoating becomes possible.
The psychoanalytic concept of scapegoating describes a process in which a group projects unwanted fears, conflicts, or aggression onto a designated target. The target becomes a container for anxieties that belong to the larger group. In this sense, the Jewish student, the Israeli researcher, or the Zionist faculty member can become transformed from a person into a symbol. Yet it is relational the projector and the projected who is not protected.
Sherry Turkle, an MIT professor known for her work on technology and human relationships, has spent decades examining what happens when authentic conversation is replaced by mediated interaction. Her concern has been that technology can create distance between people: we may communicate more while understanding each other less. Her work asks whether we are losing the ability to sit with another person’s complexity.
The crisis described by Sheffi’s book suggests a parallel danger within institutions. Ideological categories can function like digital filters: they simplify reality. A person is no longer encountered as a colleague, student, or neighbor, but as a representative of an abstract category — oppressor, colonizer, privileged group, or enemy.
This is where empathy fails.
Empathy does not require agreement. It requires the ability to recognize another person’s humanity even when one disagrees with their political views. A university that loses this capacity risks replacing inquiry with moral sorting.
The tragedy is that MIT, one of the world’s great centers of scientific innovation, became a place where Jewish members of its community felt they had to prove their right to belong. Science depends on curiosity — the willingness to examine assumptions, question prevailing narratives, and revise conclusions. When ideological certainty replaces curiosity, even brilliant institutions become vulnerable to collective psychological processes.
My own research into trauma and antisemitism has shown me that prejudice often does not appear first as an explicit declaration of hatred. It can emerge through patterns: exclusion, double standards, what appears to be ‘selective’ empathy, and the gradual transformation of a group into a problem to be managed.
Sheffi’s account of MIT is therefore not only about Jews at MIT. It is about what happens to any institution when human beings become abstractions.
The question for MIT — and for universities more broadly — is not merely how to regulate speech or manage protests. The deeper question is whether these institutions can recover the lost art that Turkle has defended for years: the ability to have a real conversation with another person whose experience challenges our own.
Without that capacity, knowledge may appear as if continuing to advance, but wisdom retreats.



Very well written article, Nancy 👍💯