When Negotiation is Only "As If" - On Communication with Hamas

A striking observation by an Israeli interlocutor raises a different question: what if Hamas is not operating at the level of articulated, responsive communication we assume?

This essay considers the implications of that gap.

AI translation in Hebrew and Portuguese below. 19.04.26 at nancyharteveltkobrin.substack

What appears to be dialogue may not function as such

I have not been able to relocate the exact source, but a recent remark attributed to an Israeli expert who had direct contact with Hamas has stayed with me because of how striking it was. He described being genuinely shocked—not only by the intransigent and demanding tone, which one expects—but by something much more basic: the way Hamas communicated.

What struck him was how limited and poorly developed their expression seemed. They struggled, so to speak, to put two words together in any coherent, responsive way. And this raised a disturbing question: how had we come to construct Hamas as so sophisticated, so strategically articulate, even “larger than life,” if at the level of actual communication something so constrained was being encountered?

It was, in effect, an as-if moment. The exchange took the form of negotiation, but did not function as such. The outer structure was there—demands, responses, positions—but the expected qualities of dialogue were missing. There was little sense of articulated thought being developed, modified, or engaged. Instead, communication appeared repetitive, fixed, and resistant to real exchange.

This matters. Because much of the analytic and policy framework assumes that Hamas can be engaged as a strategic actor operating within a recognizable logic—one in which language conveys intention, and intention can be interpreted, negotiated, and influenced. But if the communication itself is constrained, then that assumption may be part of the problem.

What may have been missed is not only a misreading of Hamas’s intentions, but a misreading of its form of expression. In retrospect, one has to ask whether this “oddity”—this gap between expectation and encounter—could have been used differently, perhaps even as a point of leverage in counterterrorism thinking.

None of this diminishes the reality of Hamas’s brutality. The massacre of October 7 demonstrated, in the most horrific way, its capacity for violence. The organization is unquestionably dangerous. But danger and sophistication are not the same thing—and conflating the two may have contributed to a Konseptzia: an inflated analytic frame that endowed Hamas with a level of coherence and sophistication it did not, in fact, possess.

If that is the case, then the “as-if” moment does more than disrupt the idea of negotiation—it forces a different question altogether: what kind of communicative organization is being encountered, if the basic conditions for dialogue are not present? The shock described by the Israeli observer suggests that something shifted in how he was listening—not only to what was being said, but to how it was being said.

In psychoanalysis, we speak of a “third ear”—a way of listening that attends to gaps, repetitions, and failures of articulation. Not to diagnose, but to understand how thinking and feeling are organized and expressed. What appears to have registered in that encounter was not simply intransigence, but a limitation in the capacity to elaborate, to respond, and to develop thought through language.

None of this makes Hamas less dangerous. October 7 put that beyond doubt. But danger is not the same as sophistication. If we have mistaken one for the other—if we have engaged “as if” a fully articulated strategic actor were present—we may have overlooked something essential. The question is whether that moment of listening revealed not only a gap in communication, but a limitation in thinking itself—and whether that, too, should have informed how Hamas was understood and confronted.

עברית

כאשר המשא ומתן הוא רק “כאילו”: על תקשורת עם חמאס

מה שנראה כדיאלוג אינו בהכרח מתפקד ככזה

לא הצלחתי לאתר את המקור המדויק, אך אמירה אחרונה המיוחסת למומחה ישראלי שהיה במגע ישיר עם חמאס נחרתה בזיכרוני בשל עוצמתה. הוא תיאר תחושת הלם אמיתית—לא רק מן הטון הבלתי מתפשר והתובעני, כפי שניתן לצפות—אלא ממשהו בסיסי יותר: האופן שבו חמאס מתקשר.

מה שהכה בו היה עד כמה הביטוי שלהם נראה מוגבל ולא מפותח. הם התקשו, כביכול, לחבר שתי מילים לכדי תגובה קוהרנטית ומגיבה. ומכאן עלתה שאלה מטרידה: כיצד הגענו לראות את חמאס כגוף כה מתוחכם, כה אסטרטגי, אפילו “גדול מהחיים”, אם ברמת התקשורת בפועל נחשפת מגבלה כה ברורה?

זה היה, למעשה, רגע של “כאילו”. המפגש קיבל צורה של משא ומתן, אך לא תפקד ככזה. המבנה החיצוני היה קיים—דרישות, תגובות, עמדות—אך האיכויות הצפויות של דיאלוג נעדרו. לא הייתה תחושה של מחשבה מנוסחת המתפתחת, משתנה או נכנסת לאינטראקציה. במקום זאת, התקשורת נראתה חזרתית, מקובעת ועמידה בפני חילופי דברים אמיתיים.

יש לכך חשיבות. שכן חלק גדול מן המסגרת האנליטית והמדינית מניח כי ניתן להתייחס לחמאס כשחקן אסטרטגי הפועל בתוך היגיון מוכר—כזה שבו השפה מבטאת כוונה, וכוונה ניתנת לפרשנות, למשא ומתן ולהשפעה. אך אם עצם התקשורת מוגבלת, ייתכן שהנחה זו היא חלק מן הבעיה.

ייתכן שהוחמצה לא רק הבנה שגויה של כוונות חמאס, אלא גם של אופן הביטוי שלו. בדיעבד, יש לשאול האם אותה “מוזרות”—הפער בין הציפייה לבין המפגש—יכלה לשמש אחרת, אולי אף כמנוף לחשיבה מחודשת בלוחמה בטרור.

אין בכך כדי להפחית מאכזריותו של חמאס. אירועי 7 באוקטובר הבהירו זאת באופן מזעזע. הארגון מסוכן ללא ספק. אך מסוכנות אינה זהה לתחכום—והבלבול ביניהן עשוי היה להוביל לקונספציה (Konseptzia): מסגרת אנליטית מנופחת שייחסה לחמאס רמת קוהרנטיות ותחכום שלא הייתה קיימת בפועל.

אם כך, רגע ה“כאילו” אינו רק מערער את עצם הרעיון של משא ומתן—הוא מחייב שאלה אחרת: איזה סוג של ארגון תקשורתי עומד מולנו, אם התנאים הבסיסיים לדיאלוג אינם מתקיימים? ההלם שתיאר אותו משקיף ישראלי מצביע על שינוי באופן ההקשבה—לא רק למה שנאמר, אלא לאיך שהוא נאמר.

בפסיכואנליזה אנו מדברים על “אוזן שלישית”—דרך הקשבה המכוונת לפערים, לחזרות ולכשלי ניסוח. לא לצורך אבחון, אלא להבנת האופן שבו מחשבה ורגש מאורגנים ומתבטאים. מה שנרשם באותו מפגש לא היה רק עיקשות, אלא מגבלה ביכולת להרחיב, להגיב ולפתח מחשבה באמצעות השפה.

אין בכך כדי להפחית מן הסכנה. אך אם בלבלנו בין סכנה לתחכום—אם פעלנו “כאילו” מדובר בשחקן אסטרטגי מנוסח היטב—ייתכן שהחמצנו דבר מה מהותי. השאלה היא האם אותה הקשבה חשפה לא רק פער בתקשורת, אלא מגבלה באופן החשיבה עצמו—והאם היה בכך כדי להשפיע על האופן שבו יש להבין ולהתמודד עם חמאס.

Português

Quando a Negociação é Apenas “Como Se”: Sobre a Comunicação com o Hamas

O que parece ser diálogo pode não funcionar como tal

Não consegui localizar a fonte exata, mas uma observação recente atribuída a um especialista israelense que teve contato direto com o Hamas permaneceu comigo pela sua força. Ele descreveu um momento de surpresa genuína—não apenas pelo tom intransigente e exigente, esperado—mas por algo mais básico: a forma como o Hamas se comunicava.

O que o impressionou foi o quão limitada e pouco desenvolvida parecia essa expressão. Eles, por assim dizer, tinham dificuldade em articular duas palavras de forma coerente e responsiva. Isso levanta uma questão perturbadora: como passamos a construir o Hamas como tão sofisticado, tão estrategicamente articulado, até mesmo “maior que a vida”, se no nível da comunicação algo tão restrito estava sendo encontrado?

Foi, de fato, um momento de “como se”. A troca assumia a forma de negociação, mas não funcionava como tal. A estrutura externa estava presente—demandas, respostas, posições—mas as qualidades esperadas do diálogo estavam ausentes. Havia pouca sensação de pensamento articulado sendo desenvolvido, modificado ou engajado. Em vez disso, a comunicação parecia repetitiva, fixa e resistente a uma troca real.

Isso importa. Porque grande parte da análise e das políticas pressupõe que o Hamas pode ser tratado como um ator estratégico dentro de uma lógica reconhecível—na qual a linguagem transmite intenção, e a intenção pode ser interpretada, negociada e influenciada. Mas se a própria comunicação é limitada, essa suposição pode ser parte do problema.

Talvez tenha havido não apenas uma leitura equivocada das intenções do Hamas, mas também da forma de sua expressão. Em retrospecto, é necessário perguntar se essa “estranheza”—esse descompasso entre expectativa e realidade—poderia ter sido utilizada de outra forma, talvez até como ponto de alavancagem no pensamento antiterrorista.

Nada disso diminui a brutalidade do Hamas. O massacre de 7 de outubro demonstrou, da forma mais horrível possível, sua capacidade de violência. O grupo é, sem dúvida, perigoso. Mas perigo não é o mesmo que sofisticação—e confundir os dois pode ter levado a uma espécie de inflação analítica, uma Konseptzia que atribuiu ao Hamas um nível de coerência e sofisticação que não correspondia à realidade.

Se assim for, o momento do “como se” faz mais do que interromper a ideia de negociação—ele obriga uma nova pergunta: que tipo de organização comunicativa está sendo encontrada, se as condições básicas para o diálogo não estão presentes? O choque descrito pelo observador israelense sugere uma mudança na forma de escutar—não apenas o que é dito, mas como é dito.

Na psicanálise, falamos de um “terceiro ouvido”—uma forma de escuta que atende a lacunas, repetições e falhas de articulação. Não para diagnosticar, mas para compreender como o pensamento e o afeto são organizados e expressos. O que parece ter sido percebido nesse encontro não foi apenas intransigência, mas uma limitação na capacidade de elaborar, responder e desenvolver o pensamento por meio da linguagem.

Isso não torna o Hamas menos perigoso. Mas, se confundimos perigo com sofisticação—se o tratamos “como se” fosse um ator plenamente articulado—podemos ter deixado de perceber algo essencial. A questão é se essa escuta revelou não apenas uma falha de comunicação, mas uma limitação no próprio pensamento—e se isso deveria ter influenciado a forma como o Hamas foi compreendido e enfrentado.